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BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO

E

MERSON in his essays called "Representative Men"
speaks of the uses of great men. He says that the study
of some individuals leads us to an elemental region where
the individual is lost; that his spirit diffuses itself in his
work; and that by a study of his life we can touch and know
his summits. With this in mind, I wish to speak of the late
Justice Cardozo.
Perhaps all of you know something of Benjamin Cardozo's life. He was born in New York in 1&70. All of his
ancestors were Sephardim Jews, those cultured members of
the Jewish race who were persecuted in Spain and Portugal
in the 13th and 14th centuries and finally banished from
those countries. After migrating to Holland and England,
a number of them came to America long before the Revolution.
Many of Cardozo's forebears in this country played prominent roles in its early history. Several of them served in
Washington's army and others in the American forces in the
War of 1812. The immediate Cardozo clan was prominent
in the law. Benjamin Cardozo's grandfather was nominated
a Justice of the Supreme Court of New York, but died before he took office. His father was one of the most brilliant
judges that ever sat on that court.
Cardozo's father, though a very learned judge, had an unfortunate experience which was to play an important part
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in his son's life. The father was a judge in New York during the time when the infamous Tweed gang was rampant
in that city. At Boss Tweed's request, Cardozo's father, as
judge, appointed a certain receiver for the Erie Railroad
after Tweed's ally, Jay Gould, had manipulated it into bankruptcy. This led to an investigation by the New York Bar
Association in which it was revealed that Judge Cardozo had
appointed Boss Tweed's nephew as a receiver in more than
three hundred cases and Tweed's son as a receiver in over
one hundred other instances. As a result of the investigation, Cardozo's father resigned from the bench. It was a
severe blow to the proud and honored Cardozo family. Ben,
the future Supreme Court Judge, was only three years old
at the time. The episode had a profound effect on him as
he grew older. A burning desire to restore the name of
Cardozo to an honored place in the law developed within
him. As we know, that ambition for success in the law was
achieved.
Cardozo graduated from Columbia University at nineteen
and then attended Columbia University Law School for
two years. He was a brilliant student. He was admitted to
the Bar of New York in 1891. For twenty-two years he
practiced law in New York City. His practice was essentially that of a barrister; that is, handlipg cases for other
lawyers. Although unknown to the public generally, he attained the high respect of the Bench and Bar of New York.
During that time he wrote and published a book on the practice in the New York appellate courts.
In 1913 he was elected to the Supreme Court of New
York. Shortly thereafter he received a temporary appointment to the Court of Appeals, and in 1917 became a permanent member of that Court. There he remained until
elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1932.
The New York Court of Appeals was one of the most distinguished courts in the land. Cardozo exerted a dominant
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influence in making it such. Just as he had been known as
a lawyer's lawyer, he came to be known as a judge's judge.
His opinions were models for their lucidity, craftsmanship
and literary style. More than that, they made an immediate
impress on the common law problems which came before the
Court of Appeals.
During this time he published four little volumes dealing
with the law. Two of them, "The Nature of the Judicial
Process" and "The Growth of the Law," were lectures
which he had delivered to the Yale Law School in 1922 and
1924. I shall refer later to these books, but I should like
to say now that I can think of no way a law student or
young lawyer can better supplement his "must" work than
by reading these gems of legal philosophy and thought.
In 1932 Justice Holmes resigned. Almost unanimously
the Bench and Bar of the country suggested that Cardozo
be appointed to fill the vacancy. It was in the nature of a
national call. Probably no man ever ascended the Supreme
Court more reluctantly than Cardozo. He loved his work
on the New York Court of Appeals, and he had a genuine
affection for his colleagues on the bench. He hated to
leave; however, he accepted the appointment and went to
Washington.
Justice Cardozo was on the Supreme Court bench less than
six full terms. He died in 1938. Although he was a member of the highest court of the land only a short time, he
had the same profound effect in the domain of public law
that he previously had asserted in the common law field.
In appraising Cardozo's influence on the law, perhaps the
first thing to be noted is his legal craftsmanship. He was a
master of the common law. He knew its sources and history. He did what Holmes said was the first essential: simply going to the bottom of the subject.
His vast learning and culture made Cardozo a master also
of the English language. Although he has better claims to
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posterity, the literary quality of his opinions has earned for
him a niche in the hall of legal fame. In his masterful
essay, "Law and Literature," he confesses to the principle
which you will find is an ingredient in all of his opinions.
There he quotes Henry James, as follows: "'Form alone
takes, and holds and preserves substance, saves it from the
welter of helpless verbiage that we swim in as in a sea of
tasteless tepid pudding.' " Then he goes on to say. "This
is my own faith. The argument strongly put is not the same
as the argument put feebly any more than the 'Tasteless
Tepid Pudding' is the same as the pudding served to us in
triumph with all the glory of the lambent flame. The
strength that is born of form, and the feebleness that is born
of the lack of form, are qualities of the substance. They are
the tokens of the thing's identity. They make it what it is."
If you wish to know more about the secret of Cardozo's
talent for exact and faultless expression, you can find it in
this little essay. Nor need you look further for proof of
Cardozo's greatness as a literary stylist. It has a charm and
exquisiteness that makes for delightful reading.
Beyond his mastery of the common law and of the written
word was Cardozo's passion for justice. Call it by other
names - his philosophy of law, his judicial approach or his
method of judging - it made a profound and lasting impression on legal thought. His was a life-long quest: How
does the law grow? How does it bridge the gap between the
experiences of yesterday and the needs of today? How can
it be a permanent thing, something to rely and act upon,
and yet fulfill the changing exigencies of the hour? The
answer to these questions was a life-long search for Cardozo.
I barely can touch on his views on these fundamental
problems of jurisprudence. For their full import you will
have to read the lectures he delivered to the Yale law students. In one of them he quotes Dean Pound as saying,
"Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." Then
Cardozo continues "Here is the great antinomy confront-
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ing us at every turn. Rest and motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive. The law, like human kind,
if life is to continue, must find some path of compromise.
Two distinct tendencies, pulling in different directions must
be harnessed together and made to work in unison. All depends on the wisdom with which the joinder is effected."'
It is to this idea that Cardozo gave so much of his thought.
Law, we know, must be certain; without certainty, there is
no law. It must have a uniformity of application. Principles and rules of conduct cannot be changed to fit the
whims of the occasion. On the other hand, a certain elasticity is required so that needed growth can take place. The
rules of conduct must not be too hard and fast; fluidity is
needed to meet the novel set of facts. The molds used to
fashion yesterday's judicial determination may not fit today's problem, posed for the law to settle. An outstanding
example comes to mind. All of you who have studied equity
know that equitable remedies came into being because the
common law legal procedure had become so crystalized and
hardened that it could no longer meet many of the needs
which justice demanded. This of course is an outstanding
example of the law's growth. There have been thousands
of changes more subtle or perhaps, I should say, less drastic,
effected by the judicial process.
A main topic which Cardozo discusses in his lectures is
how law is created. Of course we know that statute law is
created by the legislature. But how about judge-made law?
True, most cases are decided on precedent. Ordinarily, the
law found in other cases is sufficient to decide the case at
hand. But there are cases when new or different rules must
be fashioned. Cardozo asked the question, what are the principles that determine the creation of the rule in such instances? He did not agree with those legal thinkers who
argue that the judge in announcing a new principle or rule is
only discovering something already existing within the body
1 The Growth of the Law, p. 2.
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of the law. His view was that the judge at times creates law;
that is, he is a legislator, albeit in a very limited sense, and
that the body of the law is being constantly molded and remolded by the courts. I quote from one of his lectures:
"We have the conception of law as a body of rules and principles and standards which in their extension to new combinations of events are to be sorted, selected, molded and
adopted in subordination to an end. A process of trial and
error brings judgments into being. A process of trial and
error determines their right to reproduce their kind." 2
For a specific example I refer to a case in which Cardozo
wrote one of his most famous opinions, MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.' The facts were these: The defendant manufactured automobiles. It sold an automobile to a retail auto
dealer who in turn sold it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
injured because of a defective wheel. Although the defendant as the manufacturer of the automobile had purchased the wheel from another manufacturer, it had been.
negligent in failing to ascertain the defect. The plaintiff
sued the Buick Motor Company for his injuries and recovered. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed. In
his opinion Cardozo demonstrated how the law grows to
meet changed conditions.
In 1842 an English court decided a similar case which the
American courts followed until MacPkerson v. Buick Motor
Co. was decided. This was the case of Winterbottom v.
Wright.4 There a contractor furnished a mail coach to the
Postmaster General. The coach collapsed and injured the
driver. Although the injured driver, as plaintiff, charged the
contractor with negligence in furnishing a defective coach,
the English court held that there was no relation between
the driver and the contractor; that the only duty owed by
the contractor was to the person to whom the coach was
3

The Growth of the Law, p. 55.
217 N. Y. 382.

4

10 M. & W. 109.

2
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furnished, that is, the Postmaster General. The rule was
subsequently modified in cases where the courts held the
thing manufactured was "imminently dangerous to life,"
such as firearms and explosives. The courts held that these
instances were exceptions to the general rule laid down in
Winterbottom v. Wright; however, since the MacPherson
case the exception has become the prevailing rule of law. In
his opinion Cardozo traces the history of the principle announced in the English case and then demonstrates that it
is outmoded for the needs of modern manufacturing and
distributing methods. Thus, the law has changed so that it
may function more satisfactorily under present day conditions.
In speaking of this growth of the law, I am not talking of
the great postulates of justice. These do not change. What
do change are the subsidiary rules and principles which stem
from those postulates. These changes come gradually. Case
follows case, each pushing a little farther out, until, before
we realize it, the established rule has been abandoned and
a new rule has taken its place. Cardozo likened the law's
growth to a slowly moving glacier and in another instance
to an erosion, the gradual pushing out of principles from
the mound of known and established law into the unexplored areas. Holmes stated it differently in Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, when he wrote, "With regard to the police
power, as elsewhere in the law, lines are pricked out by the
gradual approach and contact of decisions on the opposing
sides." '
What really concerned Cardozo was not that the law
grows, but how it.grows. What does the judge call upon in
reaching a decision that may announce a new principle?
How does he create either a new rule or a different shading
of an old rule when confronted with a novel problem? What
are his tools for these changes and how does he use them?
5

219 U. S. 104.
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In his lectures, entitled "The Nature of the Judicial Process," Cardozo expounds his ideas on this subject. He says
that the judge may use any of four methods or any of these
in combination. In his own words these four methods are,
"The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the
line of logical progression: this I will call the rule of analogy
or the method of philosophy; along the line of the customs
of the community: this I will call the method of tradition;
along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the
mores of the day; and this I will call the method of sociology." 6 These not only are methods of advancing the law
but, as he points out, they also are limitations on the freedom of the judge in deciding a case. There is some freedom, but only so much as is dictated by the novelty of the
facts and as permitted by the methodology outlined by Cardozo. In other words, the judge is limited in his freedom
to make changes insofar as existing rules can only be changed
through logical or historical development or by recognition
of changed custom or, finally, by an acknowledgment that
the modified rule will function better under present circumstances. This last method of change Cardozo thought to be
the most important. The real test of a rule's right to exist,
according to Cardozo, is its workability. Does it function
satisfactorily under present conditions, was his final question in fashioning a legal rule; this, because the law is a
"means to an end and not an end in itself."
Cardozo was a modest, quiet man of high principles. He
had no thought of stating any revolutionary ideas about the
law. Indeed, he did not. What he tried to do was to develop a better understanding of how the law functions and
how it keeps pace with the changing needs of life itself.
Cardozo loved the law. He was devoted to it. Justice
Holmes once said of Cardozo, "He was a great and beautiful spirit." After his death Judge Learned Hand wrote these
6

The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 30.
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well chosen words, "He was wise because he was uncontaminated, because he knew no violence, or hatred, or envy,
or jealousy, or ill will * * *.

In this America of ours where

the passion for publicity is a disease, it was a rare good fortune that brought to such eminence a man so reserved, so
unassuming, so retiring, so gracious to high and low, and
so serene." 7

I conclude by quoting from one of Cardozo's rare addresses. In 1925 he spoke to the graduating class of the Albany law school. After telling his audience that if they believed that the ordeal of learning the law was over upon
graduation, they were doomed to disillusionment, he expressed these significant thoughts: "But if you bear in mind
the truth that this is only the commencement, the troubles
are only beginning, and if you act upon that faith, behold
by some subtle necromancy, the pain that you foresee sha:ll
be transmitted into joy. The troubles will emerge as triumphs; the travail and the doubt will yield an unexpected
peace; the great truth will have been that the quest is
greater than what is sought, the effort finer than the prize,
or, rather, that the effort is the prize - the victory cheap
and hollow were it not for the rigor of the game ****

Give

what you have, whether what you have be much or little.
You will be sharers in a process that is greater than the
greatest of its ministers." 8
Luther M. Swygert.

7 52 Harvard Law Review, p. 361.
8 Law and Literature, p. 163.

